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Voice, power and legitimacy: the role of the legal person in river 
management in New Zealand, Chile and Australia 
 
Abstract 
In 2017, rivers in New Zealand, India and Colombia received legal rights and were granted 
the status of legal persons. The increased legal powers can improve environmental protection 
and river management, but they can also challenge the legitimacy of laws and regulations that 
protect the rivers. In this paper, we compare the new legal rights with two long-standing uses 
of legal personality in river management, to explore the effects of legal personality. We find 
that it is difficult to get the right balance between giving rivers a voice, and the power to use 
it, and creating collaborative governance arrangements that strengthen and maintain 
community support over time.  
Key words 
Legal personality, river, legitimacy, water resource management 
 
1 Introduction 
Legal frameworks that regulate the management and use of water aim to manage water 
resources efficiently, and protect river health, to maintain water’s economic and health 
qualities, so that humans might continue to benefit from them (UNCED 1992). This 
anthropocentric approach centres human uses, and human values, of water resources. 
However, in many parts of the globe, courts and legislatures are beginning to acknowledge 
value in protecting natural resources as an end in itself (Burdon 2010, Maloney and Burdon 
2014). Applying such an ‘ecocentric’ approach assumes that rivers have an intrinsic right to 
their own protection and maintenance (O'Riordan 1991).  
In 2017, rivers became the recipients of these new and powerful legal rights. The Aotearoa 
New Zealand Parliament broke new ground internationally by recognising the Whanganui 
River as a ‘legal person’, with ‘all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a legal person’ 
(Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act, 2017). A similar approach has 
also been adopted in India and Colombia, although the Indian case has since been appealed 
(O'Donnell 2018, Macpherson and Ospina 2018). The grant of legal personality is the newest 
legal tool being used to protect and manage rivers. Recognising rivers as legal persons means 
that the rivers themselves are the subject of legal rights, and have the necessary standing to 
sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and hold property in their own name (O'Donnell and 
Talbot-Jones 2017). 
This shift in river governance has been driven largely by indigenous communities, who claim 
distinct relationships with water based on guardianship, symbiosis and respect (Morris and 
Ruru 2010). Legal personality may offer opportunities to secure new or different outcomes in 
environmental law and regulation in situations where the river needs its own voice in order to 
compete for outcomes with other river interests or users. However, legal personality comes at 
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a cost. By creating a ‘voice’ for the river, and enabling the river to compete with other users, 
legal rights for rivers can challenge the legitimacy of laws and regulations that protect the 
river (O'Donnell 2017a).  
Legitimacy, along with efficacy and efficiency, is one of the core criteria for sustainable 
water resource management (O'Donnell and Garrick 2017a). But defining exactly what 
legitimacy means is difficult. Legally, legitimacy stems from the power of an individual to 
make a particular decision or take a certain action. However, legitimacy is broader than legal 
authority (O'Donnell et al. 2018). Hogl et al. (2012) describe legitimacy in environmental 
management as:  
• Input legitimacy, or the process by which outcomes are achieved, including 
transparency, access, and accountability; 
• Output legitimacy, where legitimacy is linked to the outcomes achieved, and a 
common understanding of why those outcomes matter. 
In the context of water regulation, the OECD describes this element as trust and community 
support, which must be built, and maintained over time (OECD 2015). Finding the right 
balance between legal rights that increase the power of the river, and maintaining community 
support for management of a public resource is difficult.  The new legal rights for rivers 
create an opportunity to improve river ecosystem protection, but we still know far too little 
about the impacts of these new arrangements.  
This paper explores the potential outcomes of legal personality for legitimacy, by using older 
examples of legal personality in river management, and compares their experiences to the 
best-developed model of legal personality for rivers (in New Zealand). 
2 Legal personality and river management: a comparison of three models 
Of the three countries where rivers now have legal rights (New Zealand, Colombia, and 
India), the new arrangements closest to full implementation in New Zealand, which has a 
dedicated funding stream, new organisations, appointed river guardians, and a new 
governance framework (Macpherson and Ospina 2018, O'Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018). 
For this reason, the Whanganui River (Te Awa Tupua) has been selected as the key example 
of legal rights for rivers.  
We compare this example with two other legal arrangements for river management, both of 
which include ‘legal persons’ but do not explicitly bestow legal personality on the river itself: 
the Victorian Environmental Water Holder in Australia (which was created to act as a ‘voice’ 
for rivers in 2010) and Juntas de Vigilancia (Water Monitoring Boards) in Chile (which have 
been in operation for many years). Each of the models exists within a distinct legal, social 
and political context, and highlights the challenges and opportunities of the different 
management approaches.   
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2.1 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River), Aotearoa New Zealand 
2.1.1 Water regulation in Aotearoa New Zealand 
On average, water quantity is not a major concern for New Zealand, with high average 
rainfall (Ministry for the Environment (NZ) 2016). However, in many places New Zealand 
rivers suffer from irregular flow and poor water quality as a result of extensive agricultural 
and industrial impacts (OECD 2017).  
The Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) provides a highly integrated natural resource 
management laws and policies (Warnock and Baker-Galloway 2014), which takes an 
ecosystem approach underpinned by the concept of ‘sustainable management’ (RMA s5). 
Unlike Australia and Chile, the New Zealand approach is still a ‘planned’ rather than 
integrated-market water allocation model, with low incidence of water trading (OECD 2017). 
Like Australia, under New Zealand common law, water is vested in the Crown on behalf of 
the New Zealand public. Under the RMA, consent authorities (local municipal councils) 
make decisions to grant a ‘resource consent’ to take and use water on a ‘first come, first 
served’ basis. These consents are temporary, (up to 35 years), but otherwise have many of the 
same characteristics as derechos de aprovecahmiento in Chile or ‘water access entitlements’ 
in Australia (see below).  
The RMA expressly requires consent authorities to recognise and provide for ‘relationship of 
Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu 
[sacred sites], and other taonga [treasures]’ (s 6), and the concept of ‘kaitiakitanga’ 
[guardianship] (s 7). The RMA also allows municipal councils to enter into collaborative 
governance arrangements with Māori iwi and hapū (tribes and sub-tribes) over natural 
resources or to devolve decision-making on resource management to Māori groups (ss58L-
58U). Such ‘co-management’ arrangements have been used in the past for rivers, often as a 
consequence of settlements of Māori claims for redress under the Treaty of Waitangi, 
including for the Waikato River. Part 9 of the RMA also allows any person to apply to the 
Minister for the Environment for a ‘water conservation order’ to protect environmental or 
cultural water values. Yet despite these protections, in many parts of New Zealand the 
granting and exercise of resource consents has led to the pollution, eutrophication and over-
extraction of rivers, or has impacted the spiritual or physical relationship of Māori with their 
waters.  
2.1.2 Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River) 
In March 2017, Aotearoa New Zealand became the first country to pass legislation 
recognising a river as a legal person, as part of a political settlement with the Whanganui Iwi1 
who have traditionally used and held relationships with the river concerned (Macpherson and 
O’Donnell 2018). Rather than treating the river as a resource to be exploited by the people of 
the Whanganui, in the Te Awa Tupua Act 2017 (the Whanganui Iwi are positioned as 
interdependent with and owing responsibilities to the river. Yet despite its ecocentric themes, 
 
1 In this paper, for simplicity, we refer to the iwi as ‘Whanganui River Iwi’, although we acknowledge that a number 
of other iwi (tribes) and hapū (subtribes) have interests in the Whanganui River.  
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the river’s rights under Te Awa Tupua Act are intrinsically tied up with the rights of the 
Whanganui River Iwi and their indigenous cultural ‘difference’ (Magallanes 2015). 
Te Awa Tupua Act is fundamentally a political settlement to one of New Zealand’s longest-
running disputes over river management and ownership, as a consequence of historical 
dispossession, environmental degradation and inequitable development (MacPherson 2016). 
This settlement forms part of a long line of settlements to Maori claims to rivers and lakes 
over the past 40 years (Ruru 2013), including the Waikato River, which was recognised as a 
‘living ancestor’ in a similar way to Te Awa Tupua, albeit without legal personality. Earlier 
river settlements have focused on giving Maori rights of ‘co-management’, or a right to 
actively participate in the governance and regulation of rivers, together with the Crown, 
consistent with the Treaty principle of partnership (a relationship typically described by the 
Māori concept of ‘kaitiakitanga’, or guardianship).  
However, Te Awa Tupua Act goes further than previous river settlements, and specifically 
declares that the river is a ‘legal person’ (Te Awa Tupua Act s14). Te Awa Tupua 
Actrecognises the status of the Whanganui River (and its tributaries) as ‘an indivisible and 
living whole, comprising the Whanganui River from the mountains to the sea, incorporating 
all its physical and meta-physical elements’ (Te Awa Tupua Act s12). This reflects the tikanga 
Māori (Maori customary law) of the Whanganui Iwi (Hutchison 2014), and can be contrasted 
with western, liberal conceptions of natural resources as divisible subjects for propertisation 
and regulation.  
The specific ‘rights, powers, duties and liabilities’ of a legal person include the rights to sue, 
be sued, enter into contracts and hold property (Stone 1972). Of course, the river itself cannot 
appear in court or purchase land, so Te Awa Tupua Act creates a representative (a guardian), 
called ‘Te Pou Tupua’, to be the human face of the river, and to act and speak for and on 
behalf of Te Awa Tupua. Te Pou Tupua is a river guardian, comprising one member 
nominated by the Crown, and another by the Whanganui River Iwi (Te Awa Tupua Act ss18-
19). The guardian model adopts the ecocentric approach to natural resource management 
(Stone 2010), as well as the principle of partnership with Māori under the Treaty of Waitangi 
(Magallanes 2015). Te Pou Tupua gives Māori a stronger role in water governance than 
previous co-management arrangements, in the form of an equal seat at the governance table.  
Although Te Pou Tupua has broad powers, it must act in the interests of the river and in 
accordance with prescribed values for the river’s management. These values (called ‘Tupua 
te Kawa’) are described as the ‘intrinsic values that represent the essence of Te Awa Tupua’ 
(s13). They recognise the direct link between the health of the river and the health of the 
people, and reiterate that the river is an indivisible and living whole from the mountains to 
the sea, incorporating physical and metaphysical elements. Tupua te Kawa are highly 
significant, as they help to shape the content of the river’s rights (Good 2013). A wide range 
of administrative decision-makers under other legislation must recognise, provide for and 
have regard to the status of Te Awa Tupua as a legal person and the statutory river values, as 
a ‘relevant consideration’ (Te Awa Tupua Act s15). However, decisions made under other 
legislation must still be consistent with the purpose of that legislation, and neither the status 
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of Te Awa Tupua as a legal person, nor Tupua te Kawa, can be determining factors in 
administrative decision (s15(5)), which considerably weakens the rights of the river.  
Finally, Te Awa Tupua Act establishes a complicated, collaborative governance regime for 
the river between Maori, municipal and central government and private users (Talbot-Jones 
2017). A range of entities are created, and a range of perspectives covered, not just those of 
Te Pou Tupua or the Whanganui River Iwi. The settlement is the culmination of more than a 
century of indigenous agitation for the right to ‘own’ the river, always resisted by the Crown 
on the basis that ‘no one can own water’. Under the Act only the Crown-owned parts of the 
bed of the river is vested in Te Awa Tupua, and the settlement has no impact on public rights 
of use, fishing or navigation or private consents or permits to use the river, a provision that 
specifically protects the rights of hydro-electric power generators. Most tellingly, the consent 
of Te Pou Tupua is not required for applications for resource consents to use the river’s water 
under the RMA (although its consent is required to use the river bed), although a consent 
authority may determine that Te Pou Tupua is an ‘affected person’ (RMA s46(3)). 
2.2 Victorian Environmental Water Holder, Australia 
2.2.1 Water regulation in Australia 
Australia faces extreme variability in water supplies, and has invested heavily in 
infrastructure to store and deliver water to where and when it is needed (Musgrave 2008). 
Like Chile, Australia uses water markets as the primary system of water re-allocation 
between uses, but these markets form part of an integrated system of water regulation, with a 
large role for government regulation (Garrick, Hernandez-Mora, and O'Donnell 2018). Like 
New Zealand, Australia’s ‘water access entitlements’, are not treated as rights of ‘property’, 
because this would be inconsistent with the vesting of all water in the Crown (Fisher 2010). 
Water reform in Australia has historically focused on the Murray-Darling Basin (Hart 2015).  
In the 1990s, in response to severe algal blooms and rising salinity in the Basin, State and 
Federal governments agreed to reconsider the Australian approach to water management 
(COAG 1994).  In the early 2000s, a national approach to water regulation saw states agree to 
cap water rights, improve transparency of water pricing, separate water rights from land titles 
and establish water trading, in addition to allocating water rights to the environment, in the 
hope of returning over-allocated systems to environmentally sustainable levels (COAG 
2004).  
In 2007, the Federal government dramatically increased its responsibility for water resource 
management within the Murray-Darling Basin (Kildea and Williams 2010). New legislation 
established a sustainable limit on water extraction in the Murray-Darling Basin, and the 
Federal government funded significant investment in water recovery for the environment, via 
water rights purchase programs and investment in water efficiency projects (Australian 
Government 2010). New organisations now hold and manage substantial volumes of water 
rights for the environment (O'Donnell and Garrick 2017b). 
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2.2.2 The Victorian Environmental Water Holder 
The state of Victoria in south-eastern Australia has been a leader in environmental water 
regulation in Australia, with one of the oldest and largest formal environmental water rights, 
an entitlement to use water in the River Murray to protect and maintain flora and fauna 
habitat. In 2005, the Victorian Water Act was amended to create the ‘environmental water 
reserve’, which set aside water entitlements (usually water in storages that can be delivered to 
environmental sites), minimum river flows, and water remaining ‘above cap’ for 
environmental purposes (Foerster 2007). The Victorian government has also invested in 
recovering water for the environment, and substantial volumes of environmental water are 
now used to achieve environmental objectives throughout Victoria (Victorian Environmental 
Water Holder 2016). 
In 2010, the Victorian government established the Victorian Environmental Water Holder 
(VEWH) to efficiently manage Victoria’s environmental water entitlements to improve the 
values and health of Victoria’s aquatic ecosystems (Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (Vic) 2009). This new organisation was intended to enhance the independence, 
accountability and transparency of environmental water management. The VEWH is free to 
make decisions on environmental water use (including trade in water rights) without political 
interference, but still operates within the relevant policy framework (O'Donnell 2012). Each 
year, the VEWH makes decisions on how to use water (as instream flows, or by pumping it 
into a wetland), or whether to trade water on the market (O'Donnell 2013). 
The VEWH is a statutory corporation and is, therefore, a ‘legal person’. The VEWH is a 
‘body corporate’, which can ‘sue or be sued in its corporate name… and may do and suffer 
all acts and things that a body corporate may by law do and suffer’ (Water Act 1989 (Vic), 
s33DB). This gives the VEWH legal standing in its own right in the event of any dispute, and 
the power to enter into contracts and deal with real or personal property (O'Donnell 2017b).  
As in Chile, although the VEWH has legal personality, the rivers it manages do not. 
However, unlike Chile, river values enjoy express statutory protection as the objectives of the 
VEWH require it to ‘improve[e] the environmental values and health of water ecosystems, 
including their biodiversity, ecological functioning and water quality, and other uses that 
depend on environmental condition’ (Water Act, s33DC(b)). In addition, the environmental 
water entitlements held by the VEWH expressly state that the water allocated under these 
entitlements is to be used to achieve environmental outcomes. This minimises the potential 
for divergence between the interests of the VEWH and the environmental interests of rivers. 
In fact, the VEWH was originally intended to provide a single ‘voice’ for the aquatic 
environment in Victoria (O'Donnell 2012). In effect, the VEWH acts as a ‘guardian’ for 
environmental flows (in the rivers where it holds water rights), working with other 
environmental water holders and catchment management authorities to determine where, 
when, and how to use the water for the environment in the state of Victoria (O'Donnell 
2017a). 
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2.3 Water Monitoring Boards, Chile 
2.3.1 Water regulation in Chile 
Chile’s rivers are under increasing demands from agriculture, industry and threat of climate 
change (OECD 2016). The quality and quantity of water in many Chilean rivers, lakes and 
wetlands continues to deteriorate (OECD 2016), 72). Water law frameworks in Chile are 
characterised by an integrated-market approach loosely regulated by the Water Code 1981, 
involving a combination of centralised regulation and market transfers of unbundled derechos 
de aprovechamiento (water use rights). In this model, water is ‘national property for public 
use’, but derechos de aprovechamiento are constitutionally protected private property rights.  
The Chilean Constitution protects the right to live in an environment free from 
contamination, requires the state to preserve nature, and entitles the state to legislate 
restrictions on the exercise of rights or liberties to protect the environment (Constitución 
Política de la República de Chile, art 19).  However, the General Water Directorate has 
limited powers to intervene in the management of water to promote aquatic health, once 
derechos de aprovechamiento are allocated (O'Donnell and MacPherson 2014). 
Environmental protections were not factored into the original design of the Water Code, and 
later amendments in 2005 created new, but relatively weak and ad hoc mechanisms for 
environmental protection (Guiloff 2012).  
Recent governments have attempted, and failed, to substantially reform water law in Chile 
amongst fierce political debate going to the heart of the water allocation model. An attempt 
was made to reform the Chilean Water Code 1981 by the previous Bachelet administration to 
legislate stronger provision for minimum ecological flows and reserves, but did not provide 
for robust institutions to enforce its ambitious environmental, health and social outcomes. 
The reform, widely considered to be unsuccessful, also neglected recovery strategies to 
address existing problems caused by widespread water over-allocation (Macpherson and 
O’Donnell 2018). 
2.3.2 Water Monitoring Boards 
In the absence of strong government regulation of water use in the interests of the 
environment, the private sector has played an important role in the regulation of water via 
private organisations of water users. For natural rivers, this role is carried out at basin or 
semi-basin level by organisations known as Juntas de Vigilancia (Water Monitoring Boards). 
Water Monitoring Boards are private, not-for-profit corporations of water ‘shareholders’ in 
the river basin. Individual or corporate water users in a particular river basin receive a water 
shareholding, proportional to their respective share of total derechos de aprovechamiento in 
the catchment (Water Code 1981, art 268). The Water Code allows for the incorporation of 
Water Management Boards which become ‘legal persons’ (art 263). Thus, although no rivers 
have been recognised as legal persons in Chile, the Water Monitoring Boards do themselves 
benefit from legal personality, as they perform the ‘public’ function of managing river 
distribution and health across the whole catchment (Rojas Calderón 2014).  
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The objective of a Water Monitoring Board is to ‘manage and distribute the natural water 
sources to which its members are entitled, to use and preserve common water infrastructure 
and to carry out the other purposes prescribed by law’ (Water Code art 266). Boards have 
wide powers under the Water Code to monitor and manage the rivers within their control, 
including ensuring efficient water rights distribution, and protective and remedial measures to 
protect river health. These powers, Vergara Blanco argues, extend beyond simply managing 
the distribution and exercise of derechos de aprovechamiento, to the general governance and 
conservation of rivers (Vergara Blanco 2014). 
There is no express protection of environmental or other river values in the Water Code. 
However, many Water Monitoring Boards now have environmental programmes and claim to 
act in the interests of water sustainability. The Junta de Vigilancia Rio Huasco, for example 
has as its mission: 
 
To manage and distribute the surface and groundwater of the Huasco River basin and 
its tributaries, according to the rights of each user, protecting resource quantity and 
quality, representing irrigators before the State and private sectors, supporting the 
management of water communities and the development of the Huasco River Basin 
(Junta de Vigilancia de la Cuenca de Rio Huasco y sus Afluentes, webpage). 
3 Legal personality: voice, power, and legitimacy 
Each of the river management arrangements uses a different combination of legal powers, 
river values, and stakeholder engagement (Table 1).By comparing the most well-developed 
model of legal rights for rivers (Te Awa Tupua) with existing arrangements in Australia and 
Chile that make use of legal personality (although not directly for the river), it is possible to 
draw some early lessons. d 
 
<Insert Table 1 near here> 
 
3.1 Output legitimacy: the ability to deliver environmental outcomes 
From the perspective of output legitimacy, it is the ability of these organisations to deliver 
sustainable water management that matters most. The Water Monitoring Boards of Chile 
have the lowest integration of environmental values with legal personality. For instance, the 
Boards may not incorporate the river’s interests, nor the interests of those without formal 
derechos de aprovechamiento, such as indigenous or customary communities, public interest 
groups and non-government organisations, environmental river outcomes, or even the public 
interest (Prieto and Bauer 2012). 
Te Awa Tupua of New Zealand directly grants legal rights to the river, combined with 
statutory river values and a clear voice for the river, in the form of the guardians. However, 
Te Awa Tupua is the only example in which the legal person does not hold rights to use water 
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in the river. Although Te Awa Tupua has a clear voice, it lacks the power to use it effectively, 
which limits its ability to achieve environmental outcomes. 
The VEWH falls somewhere in the middle: an attempt to give the environment a voice in the 
allocation and management of rivers in Victoria, but without the explicit grant of legal 
personality to rivers. This means that the VEWH can only speak on behalf of the rivers in 
which it holds water rights, which only includes some of the rivers in Victoria (Victorian 
Environmental Water Holder 2016). However, the VEWH holds large volumes of water 
rights, giving its voice real power to influence water regulation and policy in Victorian rivers, 
as both a buyer and a seller of water rights, and by deciding where and when to use that water 
for the environment (O'Donnell 2017b).  
3.2 Input legitimacy: access, transparency, and engagement 
When it comes to input legitimacy, all three models include governance arrangements that 
bring together the interests of different stakeholders. The Chilean Water Monitoring Boards 
provide a forum for irrigators to influence decision-making on water resource management. 
The ‘conflict-resolution’ role these organisations play prior to the courts concerns disputes 
between water users about water allocation and use (Rios Brehm and Quiroz 1995). 
However, this also leaves them beholden to their shareholders (water users), and although the 
Water Monitoring Boards have the ability to take legal action in their own name, they are 
unlikely to do so where this conflicts with the interests of the majority. 
Like other Australian environmental water managers, the VEWH has traditionally relied on 
measures of output legitimacy to build community support, showing how much water has 
been used, and where (O'Donnell et al. 2018). However, recent years have seen a shift in 
focus to input legitimacy, with the VEWH explicitly seeking input from a wider range of 
stakeholders, including Indigenous people, irrigators, recreational fishers, duck hunters, local 
government, and local tourism associations on how to use its environmental water rights to 
deliver multiple outcomes, without compromising on its environmental objectives (Victorian 
Environmental Water Holder 2016). In particular, over the past five years, the VEWH has 
been holding regular statewide Environmental Water Matters forums, which provide an 
opportunity for a diverse group of stakeholders to participate in environmental water 
management (O’Donnell et al, this issue).  
4 Legal rights for rivers: legitimacy, collaboration, and power to enforce rights 
The Te Awa Tupua model is really an advanced collaborative governance approach, in which 
the interests of the river are emphasised in its regulation by the government, Māori and other 
community and business interests. The new management arrangements provide a forum for 
all stakeholders to engage in decision-making for the Whanganui River, and although the 
largest bloc of participants are Māori, all interests are represented (O'Donnell and Talbot-
Jones 2018). This collaborative approach helps to ensure input legitimacy, by providing for 
transparent, accountable decision-making, and equal access for all participants.  
According to the worldview of the Whananui Iwi, the river has rights to which the Iwi belong 
and not the other way around, exemplified in the Iwi’s idiom: ‘I am the river, and the river is 
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me’. However, the Māori claims to the Whanganui River were framed as ‘proprietary’ and 
‘territorial’ in nature, although still acknowledging the ancestral relationship of Maori to the 
river (Waitangi Tribunal 1999: 337, 343). From this perspective, the Te Awa Tupua Act is a 
political compromise, allowing no one the right to ‘own’ the river as a whole (Hardcastle 
2014). Avoiding the thorny issue of redistributing use rights, either to the Whanganui River 
Iwi or the river itself, was one of the reasons for recognizing the river as a legal person.  
The New Zealand model of the Whanganui River represents the first of several new 
management arrangements in which the river has its own legal rights. But the failure to give 
the river the right to its own water is a real problem for output legitimacy, which depends on 
demonstrating that the new arrangements are delivering desired outcomes. How can Te Awa 
Tupua be an ‘indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the sea incorporating 
physical and metaphysical elements’ and yet carved up into different proprietary regimes for 
the bed and water? How can the legal rights of the river be given force and effect, when the 
model has no impact on underlying (and overlapping) legal rights regimes (Hutchison 2014, 
Margil 2017)? 
In the context of the existing regime of public and private use rights to water in the 
Whanganui River, it is easy to see how the river’s interests may become subservient to those 
of its users. It is possible that Te Awa Tupua may apply for a water conservation order to 
protect flows in the river, but it is difficult to see how it can do so without affecting other 
water users, including the hydropower generators whose rights are protected in other 
legislation which the Te Awa Tupua Act has no power to override. 
Lasting success for these new arrangements will depend not only on finding a way to give the 
river’s rights force and effect (which may require the courts to resolve disputes, including 
ongoing proprietary claims maintained by Māori to the water in the river), but also on strong 
collaborative governance. The strength of the Te Awa Tupua model is that it provides a way 
to bring diverse interests in the river together, and frames policy debates around consideration 
of the river as a single interconnected entity. However, this model relies on all parties 
working together in good faith, and finding consensus-based solutions to future challenges. It 
may not always be possible to reach agreement, and the guardians of the river have a legal 
responsibility to act in its best interests. Pursuing legal avenues to uphold the rights of the 
river may undermine the legitimacy of the co-management arrangements (O’Donnell 2017a).  
4.1.1 Key finding 
The Te Awa Tupua model brings together both output and input legitimacy. It shows the 
importance of strong institutions to enforce and uphold the river’s rights, which are based on 
clear, express, statutory values. As the river acts through its guardian, it must be possible to 
hold the guardian accountable for acting in the river’s interests. Crucially, Te Awa Tupua 
includes a process for collaborative management, and a way to bring diverse interests of 
multiple stakeholders together. There is clearly a tension between the rights of the river, and 
the rights of those who use it, and the rivers rights must be legally enforceable. However, 
such enforcement should be a last resort, as it can be fatal to collaboration between 
stakeholders (O'Donnell 2017a). 
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5 Conclusion 
Legal rights for rivers may enhance environmental regulation when there is a gap in river 
protection, because the river’s interests are not being effectively provided for by existing laws 
and institutions. This is usually because the river’s interests don’t align with the interests of 
existing regulators or users, or where the interests are too fragmented to provide a holistic 
approach. In other words, legal personality adds value when a particular river, in its particular 
circumstances, needs a voice and an ability to be heard in order to compete for outcomes. For 
this reason, legal personality has been adopted in contexts where rivers are subject to a major 
threat of degradation and governments have been unable to effectively respond using existing 
mechanisms (O'Donnell and Talbot-Jones 2018).  
However, framing the river as a competitor in these situations may create perverse outcomes. 
Increased legal powers may undermine the cultural narratives that support environmental 
protection at all (O'Donnell 2017a). Getting the balance right between increasing legal power, 
and creating a voice for rivers to protect their own interests, and maintaining the legitimacy of 
a river as the recipient of special legal protections remains a real challenge. The experience of 
the Juntas de Vigilancia in Chile shows that there is the possibility of providing alternative 
dispute resolution and conflict management forums, but the river needs a strong voice in 
which to participate. In Australia, environmental water managers with legal personality are 
members of water services committees, which provide them with an opportunity to engage 
with other water users in an informal setting (O'Donnell 2017b). 
Rivers with legal rights may be able to rely on the courts to enforce their rights if necessary. 
But this adversarial process weakens collaboration between stakeholders. Building and 
maintaining support from diverse stakeholders is crucial to maintain legitimacy, and ensure 
the success of these new arrangements. Rivers with legal personality will continue to exist 
within the regulatory frameworks of water management, and increasing legal power for rivers 
does not absolve policy makers and water resource managers from the ongoing task of 
managing rivers sustainably. 
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Table 1 River rights and regulation in Chile, Australia and New Zealand (extended and 
adapted from Macpherson and O’Donnell, forthcoming; used with permission) 










Te Awa Tupua  
(New Zealand) 
Entity is a legal person Yes Yes Yes 
River is a legal person No No Yes 





River values are explicitly 
protected in law 
No Yes Yes 
River values include the 
values of human users 
Yes: irrigators Yes: water users 
dependent on 









Entity provides integrated 
water management at the 
basin or catchment scale 
Yes No Yes (although 
no existing 
rights to water 
are affected) 
Specific measures for 
including other river users 
in decision-making 
Yes No (although there 
are ways to influence 
decisions) 
Yes 
 
 
